Every action Agentics takes is written to a receipt whose hash is chained to the one before it and folded into a Merkle root that is anchored on a public blockchain. Paste a receipt hash below and this page recomputes the whole proof in your browser — leaf, chain link, Merkle root, and the on-chain anchor. You are not trusting us; you are checking our arithmetic.
The verifier calls the public Proof Ledger endpoint GET /api/proof/verify?hash= and renders every step it returns — each check actually runs; nothing is faked green.
Deep links supported: ?hash=<receipt-hash> runs verification on load, and ?tx=<anchor-txid> opens the on-chain anchor. The hash is the SHA-256 shown on any receipt in the console or a shared trust page.
Most governance tools ship a "tamper-evident" or "immutable" audit log. That means the vendor can detect edits — but you still have to trust the vendor's own copy, the vendor's own clock, and the vendor not to rewrite history and re-sign it. Agentics anchors the Merkle root of every batch on a public blockchain no one controls, so the honest question changes from "do you trust the log?" to "does the math check out?" — and anyone can answer that without us.
| Internal tamper-evident log (typical competitor) |
Agentics externally-anchored chain | |
|---|---|---|
| What it proves | The vendor can notice if a record was changed inside their own system. | Each receipt is bound by hash to the one before it, and the batch's Merkle root is fixed at a specific block on a public chain — so the record existed then and hasn't changed since. |
| Who you must trust | The vendor — their database, their keys, their word that the log wasn't rebuilt. | No one. The anchor lives on a public blockchain the vendor doesn't control; you recompute the proof against it yourself. |
| Who can check it | Usually only the vendor, or an auditor reading the vendor's exported copy. | Anyone — your auditor, your board, a regulator, a stranger — with the receipt hash and a block explorer. No Agentics account needed. |
| If the vendor is compromised or coerced | History can be rewritten and re-sealed; the "tamper-evident" seal is only as honest as its keeper. | The already-anchored roots can't be moved. Any later edit fails to fold to a root that a public block already recorded. |
| What you verify against | The vendor's dashboard says "verified." | SHA-256 you can run yourself and a transaction on solscan.io anyone can open. |
Honest scope: the anchor proves a receipt existed and is unaltered as of a public block. It does not, by itself, prove the described action was wise — only that the record of it is authentic and hasn't been quietly rewritten.
The endpoint runs every step server-side with no short-circuit and returns an ordered checklist, which this page renders exactly as-is. Each step below maps to one line in the result above.
SHA-256 the canonical receipt and confirm the leaf hash you were given is the hash of the bytes.
Confirm this receipt's prev_hash links to the receipt before it, back toward genesis — an unbroken chain.
Fold the sibling hashes to reconstruct the batch's Merkle root the leaf claims to belong to.
Confirm the memo written to the public chain equals that Merkle root — then open the transaction on solscan.io.
Fold the proof yourself in code — every field, response shape, and the public lookup are documented.